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Abstract
The purpose of this study was to extend previous examinations of commercial multi-crew airplane accidents and incidents to evaluate
the Crew Resource Management (CRM) application as it relates to error management during the final approach and landing phase of
flight. With data obtained from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), a x2
test of independence was performed to examine if there would be a statistically significant relationship between airline management
practices and CRM-related causes of accidents/incidents. Between 2002 and 2012, 113 accidents and incidents occurred in the researched
segments of flight. In total, 57 (50 percent) accidents/incidents listed a CRM-related casual factor or included a similar commentary within
the analysis section of the investigation report. No statistically significant relationship existed between CRM-related accidents/incidents
About the Authors
Frank Wagener currently works for Aviation Performance Solutions LLC (APS), dba APS Emergency Maneuver Training, based at the Phoenix-Mesa
Gateway Airport in Mesa, Arizona. APS offers comprehensive LOC-I solutions via industry-leading, computer-based, on-aircraft, and advanced full-flight
simulator upset recovery and prevention training programs. Wagener spent over 20 years in the German Air Force flying fighter and fighter training aircraft
and retired in 2011. He flew and instructed in Germany, Canada, and the United States. He holds several international pilot certificates including ATP,
CPL, CFI, as well as a 737 type rating. He graduated with honors from the Master’s in Aeronautical Science Program at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical
University. Correspondence concerning this article should be sent to frank.wagener@gmx.net.
David C. Ison has been involved in the aviation industry for over 27 years, during which he has flown as a flight instructor and for both regional and
major airlines. He has experience in a wide variety of aircraft from general aviation types to heavy transport aircraft. While flying for a major airline, Ison
was assigned to fly missions all over the world in a Lockheed L-1011. Most recently, he flew Boeing 737–800 aircraft throughout North and Central
America. He worked as an associate professor of aviation for 7 years at a small college in Montana. He is currently Discipline Chair–Aeronautics and an
assistant professor of aeronautics for Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University–Worldwide. Ison has conducted extensive research concerning aviation
faculty, plagiarism in dissertations, statistics in aviation research, as well as the participation of women and minorities in aviation. His previous work has
been published in refereed journals and has been presented at numerous education and industry conferences. Ison serves as the editor of the Collegiate
Aviation Review, the peer-reviewed journal of the University Aviation Association. He recently was honored with the prestigious Dr. Frank E. Sorenson
Award for outstanding achievement of excellence in aviation research and scholarship by the University Aviation Association. Ison also is regularly
published in popular aviation publications such as Plane & Pilot, Professional Pilot, and IFR Refresher. ASA Publications just released his first book, Oral
Exam Guide: Aircraft Dispatcher. His educational background includes a master’s in aeronautical science from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University and
a PhD in educational studies/higher education leadership/aviation higher education from the University of Nebraska–Lincoln.

http://dx.doi.org/10.7771/2159-6670.1077

F. Wagener and D. C. Ison / Journal of Aviation Technology and Engineering

3

and airline management-related cause was found. Nevertheless, the data provide support for the necessity of robust and strategically wellthought-out airline management implemented procedures and guidelines, used in modern aircrew training, in order to enhance pilot
monitoring skills for an improved CRM application in commercial aviation.
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This study critically examined the potential influences of
current Crew Resource Management policies in airline
flight operations. It also analyzed management-implemented CRM guidelines and procedures in reference to their
operational integration and adherence during the final
segment of flight. Recognized scholarly studies were
evaluated and conclusions are presented in reference to
possible future production implementations of environmental display technologies in commercial aviation.
Crew Resource Management Application in
Commercial Aviation
Travel on modern commercial airplanes is one of the
safest modes of transportation. Due to this fact, when
accidents involving air transport operations occur, they tend
to attract a significant amount of attention. Moreover,
mishaps involving large, commercial aircraft often are
accompanied by significant numbers of fatalities. Even in
light of the noteworthy technological advances in modern
aircraft, devastating crashes continue to occur. The
approach and landing phases of flight appear to be
the most problematic, as these segments account for the
majority of accidents (53 percent) while compromising a
very small portion (4 percent) of total flight time (Spare,
2006b).
Investigations indicate that human error is a contributing
factor in nearly 80 percent of all carrier incidents and
accidents. Long-term research by the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) has revealed that these
events share common characteristics. However, many
problems encountered by flight crews have little to do
with the technical side of working in a multi-crew cockpit.
Instead, poor group decision making, ineffective communication, inadequate leadership, and deficient task or
resource management have been related problems
(Shappell et al., 2006).
Traditionally, pilot training programs concentrated
almost entirely on the technical aspect of flying and on
individual performance. Crew management matters, which
also are fundamental to flight safety, were previously
not effectively addressed (FAA, 2004). Certain phases of
flight have higher requirements for coordination. One such
operational segment involves approach and landing.
Veillette (2004) found that flight crews failed to conduct
stabilized approaches in 64.4 percent of the Approach and
Landing Accidents (ALAs). In addition, from all those
unstabilized ALAs, 81 percent included rushed approaches

and 72 percent revealed inadequate crew coordination.
According to a National Transportation Safety Board study,
inadequate monitoring by flight crewmember(s) was a
factor in 63 percent of ALAs (NTSB, 2004).
It is now understood that pilot error cannot entirely be
eliminated. Therefore, it is crucial that flight crews develop
proper Error Management (EM) skills and procedures. Error
detection and recovery from errors should be reinforced in
training (FAA, 2004) in order to mitigate flight safety
occurrences. Effective Crew Resource Management (CRM)
starts in initial training and is intensified by repetition and
feedback. Therefore, EM must encompass a significant part
of CRM training, while also being built into the corporate
culture and continuously being emphasized in every
subsequent phase of training (FAA, 2004).
Many global aviation safety organizations, including the
FAA, have reconfirmed the significance of Standard
Operating Procedures (SOPs) as essential to flight safety.
Crews should have a shared mental model of each task
because only then is effective crew coordination and crew
performance attainable. SOPs have to be clear, comprehensive, and readily available in order to keep aviation
operations standardized and reduce perceptual actions by
the crew (FAA, 2003).
Crew Resource Management
Evolution/History
In the early 1950s, commercial aviation entered a period
in which aircraft began to fly farther and faster with the
widespread use of jet engines in airliners. Jet aircraft also
provided more complexity in systems and operational
procedures. Initially, additional risks that accompanied
these changes were not obvious to the aircraft designers,
engineers, or pilots. Fatal accidents increased and were
highly publicized. In general, the causal factors included
technical and mechanical issues, but the majority of the
accidents were listed as pilot error. For the aviation industry
to survive as a recognized and accepted mode of
transportation, these problems would need to be mitigated.
Improvements in aircraft equipment design as well as the
implementation of electronic warning systems reduced
the accident rate and, in many cases, also addressed human
error. The technological solutions in conjunction with flight
simulators helped the aircrews to reduce a degree of human
error and better manage the errors that came about (Kanki,
Helmreich, & Anca, 2010).
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A pivotal occurrence took place in 1978 when a
commercial airliner crashed when the flight crew mismanaged an airplane malfunction, lost situational awareness
(SA), and ran out of fuel. The inability of this crew to work
together and handle the additional workload triggered a
philosophical change in the industry to focus on human
factors training with specific concentration on leadership and
decision making. CRM was born from this catastrophe;
however, the first training concepts and courses were initially
known under the term ‘‘Cockpit Resource Management.’’
During the 1980s, one of the most striking developments in
aviation safety was the overwhelming endorsement and
widespread implementation of training programs aimed at
increasing the effectiveness of crew coordination and cockpit
management. During the mid-1990s, CRM was not universally accepted by the pilot community. It was sometimes
decried as charm school, psychobabble, and attempted
brainwashing by management (Kanki et al., 2010).
Presently, the industry is experiencing the sixth generation of CRM, which focuses on the threats and errors that
must be managed by crews to ensure safe flight. Current
CRM embraces not only optimizing the person-machine
interface and the acquisition of timely, appropriate
information, but also interpersonal activities including
leadership, effective team formation and maintenance,
problem solving, decision making, and maintaining SA.
Therefore, training in CRM requires communicating basic
knowledge of human factors concepts that relate to aviation
and providing the tools necessary to apply these concepts
operationally (Kanki et al., 2010). This research project
aims to analyze the gathered data in exactly those areas,
investigates if proper CRM procedures have been applied,
and initially, if the accident/incident aircrews have received
adequate guidance and/or training in order to apply proper
CRM procedures.
Airline CRM Training
The most central element in airline operations is the
respective air carrier’s department of flight operations.
Within this subdivision, a pivotal tool for the prevention of
pilot error has been CRM. Over the years, CRM has
expanded to integrate cabin crew as these individuals often
can provide helpful information to pilots and must be kept
informed in emergency situations. Current CRM training
continues to offer key guidance on effective communication, task sharing, team building, and teamwork. Threat and
Error Management (TEM) training endorses preemptive
strategies of threat recognition, avoidance, and management. Both CRM and TEM require data from accidents and
incidents as well as from Flight Operations Quality
Assurance (FOQA) programs and Line Operational Safety
Audits (LOSA). The most effective training platform for
airlines today is the Line-Oriented Flight Training (LOFT)
in which crews must fly a simulated flight scenario between

two or more points. These scenario-based learning tasks
involve a combination of modern, high-fidelity simulators
and the conduct of normal flight operations procedures.
LOFT provides the most realistic setting in which crew
performance, in reference to the operational environment,
can be measured. LOFT has been inadequately and
infrequently applied and only recently mandated by some
regulators (Salas & Maurino, 2010).
In order to reflect on the views of airline management,
Salas and Maurino (2010) indicate that risk reduction can
generate competitive advantage. Improved processes will
guide greater efficiency, cost reduction, and improved
system safety. New aircraft acquisition is relatively
straightforward; however, the production of safe and
well-trained flight crews is a more complex task.
Minimum training standards approved by the regulator
may not adequately prevent airline accidents. However,
training is a controllable variable in the airline safety
system, and wiser management teams will look for and
apply the best practice. The potential cost increase for air
carriers, with a contemporary CRM training update for
flight crews, would be negligible if compared to the
monetary loss of an aircraft, not even considering the
catastrophic outcome and subsequent publicity (Salas &
Maurino, 2010).
International Policies
Since the initial development of the airplane into a global
instrument of transportation, air travel has encountered
various challenges across the globe. The coordination of
operational laws, procedures, and techniques is far beyond
the capability of individual governments to solve. The
standardization of internationally recognized services and
procedures is a fundamental aspect of safe operations in the
aviation industry in order to alleviate errors caused by
misunderstanding or lack of experience. The organization
of the standards—such as air traffic control, personnel
licensing, and airport and airplane design—all require
actions surpassing the national borders of individual
countries. The Chicago Conference of 1944 established
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to
advance the planning and development of international air
transport in accordance with specific principles. The ICAO
assembly is composed of one representative from each
contracting state. Today, there are close to 200 members
(Wensveen, 2007).
CRM application in commercial aviation around the
world is as diverse as the cultures in which it has been
implemented. First developed in the United States, its
international migration has been varied. Ranging from
welcoming approval to simple rejection, most CRM
concepts traveled readily throughout different parts of the
world. Kanki et al. (2010) distributed a survey to South
American, Asian, and Middle Eastern airlines in order to
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gather a cross-section of the experiences their CRM
developers and managers encountered. All of the pilot
contributors had, on average, 8 to 15 years of CRM design
and delivery experience. The following broad areas of
CRM influences were selected: perceptions of CRM
success in relation to local operations, the impact of TEM
on CRM, and the future of CRM in the respective
countries. The foremost responses about CRM success in
programs outside the U.S. were concentrated on the new
delivery format of training. Using line pilots as facilitators
was widely accepted, but in strong hierarchical cultures the
expectation was rather on a top-to-bottom delivery from
management. However, having a current pilot instead of a
training consultant as the facilitator made the program more
credible, especially when focusing on EM, as the topics
were then only discussed amongst peers (Kanki et al.,
2010).
In addition, the biggest beneficiary in line operations was
the co-pilot. In high power/distance cultures like China,
Latin America, and some Asian countries, the importance
and respect for rank, elders, and leaders is dominant.
Nonetheless, in regards to their flight safety, the management of human error is most important. Therefore, by
assuring and authorizing the First Officer (FO) to assert his/
her concerns, the captain in a commercial multi-crew
cockpit will only benefit from the FO’s input and better
manage the existing threats and errors. Implementation of
TEM was welcomed as it focused more on a scenario-based
problem than on a single human factor issue. However, the
initial confusion about the role of TEM had to be
overcome. Some believed it would replace CRM and some
saw it as a critical update (Kanki et al., 2010).
Language differences are still considered to be the most
challenging hurdle in proper CRM implementation outside
the English-speaking countries. In general, the future of
CRM outside the U.S., unfortunately, does not take the
primary concern of some countries, especially in those
outside the Western and English-speaking cultures.
Without continuous influx of data, CRM can quickly turn
into a bureaucratic obligation in the air carriers’ annual
training (Kanki et al., 2010).
Under the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA),
CRM is also known as Multi-Crew Cooperation (MCC)
training, which requires completion before a type rating is
issued. Current CRM training continuously provides key
guidance on effective communication, task sharing, team
building, and teamwork—utilizing appropriate flight deck
behaviors for safe operations (Salas & Maurino, 2010).
Problem Identification
Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT) is one of the main
aviation hazards addressed by aviation safety organizations
around the globe. Exigent literature indicates that almost 50
percent of 107 recent CFIT accidents were related to failure
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of SOP adherence (FAA, 2003). In addition, several studies
of crew performance, incidents, and accidents have
revealed that insufficient flight crew monitoring is
negatively impacting flight safety. Effective monitoring
can be the last line of defense before an accident occurs as
error detection can break the chain of events that result in
dire consequences (FAA, 2004). Crew monitoring performance can be significantly enhanced by developing and
implementing effective SOPs to support this function
(FAA, 2003).
Seasoned pilots continue to have ALAs even with the
availability of safe alternatives such as diverting to alternate
airfields and initiating early missed approach maneuvers
(Spare, 2006a). Clearly, experience level does not assure
immunization against errors; conversely, experience can
actually increase susceptibility to an ALA (Spare, 2006b).
The true key to flight safety is to effectively manage these
errors, thus preventing small errors from escalating to
dangerous levels (Spare, 2006a). This is a collective crew
effort and needs to be addressed in training, evaluation, and
more importantly during operations—independently of
who is actually committing the error versus who is
detecting it.
Besco et al. (1994) pointed out that pilot error has been
recognized in up to 80 percent of the airline accidents
worldwide. However, this study already demonstrated that
in almost all of those accidents, one of the most frequent
recommendations had been to modify or increase the
emphasis in the training programs for aircrews. This
institutional problem is not to be underestimated and will
also be examined with the latest training concepts in
reference to EM and crew monitoring procedures.
Review of Relevant Literature
Error Detection and Prevention
According to an NTSB research study, as cited in
Orasanu et al. (1998), the majority of the accidents where
crew behavior played a role involved monitoring and
challenging errors. After an error occurred, the crew either
did not detect it or failed to communicate effectively in
order to improve the outcome. In most of the accidents the
captain committed the error as the pilot flying (PF) and the
first officer (FO), as the non-flying pilot, failed to recognize
and correct it. However, team structure advantage comes
into play. Members can support each other, identify errors,
and possibly avoid serious consequential results (Orasanu
et al., 1998).
Orasanu et al. (1998) suggest two factors that influence
the probability of monitoring and challenging errors in
their study: the risk level associated with the developing
situation and the extent of face threat involved in
addressing an error with the other crewmember. In regards
to the level of risk, the expectation was that for the more
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dangerous scenarios the crew’s monitoring would be
more precise than that for the low-risk situation. In
reference to face threat, investigation focused on the
degree of challenge to the status or integrity toward the
other crewmember. The participants were all male Boeing
747 flight crews from the same U.S. airline. As
anticipated, high face threat suppressed the error detection
rate of the FOs. However, this was only noticeable in
conditions of high risk. In general, captains were more
perceptive to proper risk assessment in a particular
situation, while the FOs were more concerned with a
possible face threat within the cockpit. In sum, the FOs
were clearly attentive to social implications of challenging
the captains. For instance, when the situation called for a
high-risk outside the cockpit, the FOs were very confident
in pointing out the risk.
Conversely, if a high-risk level was noticed inside the
cockpit, the FOs had a tendency to demonstrate somewhat
weak detection of risk. During the subsequent flight
debriefing, the FOs were generally expressing that they
had been relying more on the expertise of the captain. The
findings undoubtedly indicate that social aspects of even
experienced aircrews play a crucial role in their performance.
Evidently, more work is necessary in effectively communicating in high-risk situations, particularly in those that
involve high face threat (Orasanu et al., 1998). Multi-crew
cockpit crews require strategic procedures and guidelines on
how to deal with socially sensitive challenges. Role-play, for
example, is a seemingly suitable response where young and/
or inexperienced FOs can practice developing assertiveness
skills (NTSB, 2011). Yet the responsibility rests with airline
management and training to steer crewmembers in developing the right attitudes in order to promote safe flight over
social apprehension.
Threat and Error Management
Flight crew training
TEM stands for avoiding threats or opportunities for
error. Moreover, it detects new threats or errors and
decreases their effects, while at last it manages the
consequences of any threat or error (Spare, 2006a). TEM
training helps pilots to attain an enhanced level of
performance that will permit them to deal with the
increased challenges of sustaining safe flying operations
(Gunther & Tesmer, 2001). Helmreich, Klinect, and
Wilhelm (2001) developed a model of EM that distinguishes between five types of error: procedural error,
communication error, proficiency error, decision error,
and intentional non-compliance. Their research indicated
that the highest percentage of errors (50 percent) involved
intentional non-compliance, which included violations.
Yet only 6 percent led to an undesired aircraft state. Quite
the opposite case existed with lack of proficiency and
decision error, as each accounted for only 5 percent

of the errors, but around 60 percent of those were
significant.
The descent, approach, and landing phase of flight
account for the highest number of threats (36 percent) and
errors (40 percent). The Continental Airlines’ LOSA 2000,
in relation to the one four years earlier, indicated a 70
percent reduction of unstabilized approaches. This unmistakably demonstrated that the 1997 implemented CRM
training course in EM was not only accepted by the pilots,
but also was integrated into their daily operations. LOSA
data provides transparency into areas of need but also
detects superior performance. Hence, rewarding outstanding behavior instead of punishing failure can provide
powerful learning (Helmreich et al., 2001).
When aircrews successfully detect and acknowledge
threats as red flags, they are in a better position to manage
the threat so it becomes insignificant. Typically, accident
crews do not recognize all the threats or their severity,
which invites error and consequently increases workload
(Gunther & Tesmer, 2001).
Applying TEM to ALAR
The Flight Safety Foundation encourages TEM as a
means for Approach and Landing Accident Reduction
(ALAR). Threats are not errors, but threats magnify the
potential for error. Managing threats involves the following
processes: threat avoidance, threat identification or classification, trapping the threat, and resolving or mitigating it.
Apparently, unexpected threats are the ones that are the most
dangerous. However, a detailed preparation in combination
with an effort to obtain all accessible information concerning
a situation reduces the probability of any unexpected threats
(Spare, 2006a). Most importantly, any existing error in the
approach path needs to be acknowledged first and then
trapped before it creates a flight safety hazard.
Errors emerge as a result from past activities. They are
effects and not causes. Usually, errors fall into two
categories: an SA error, when incorrect interpretations of
a problem result in a wrong decision, and a course of action
error, where a correct perception is present but an
inappropriate course of action is chosen (Spare, 2006b).
A practical plan to alleviate errors during an approach-tolanding is to include the so-called approach gates. Those
gates specify that certain parameters should be met at
specific points along the route; otherwise, the pilots are
forced into a different course of action, such as a go-around
maneuver (Spare, 2006a). The FAA (2003) lists the exact
parameters and limitations for a so-called stabilized
approach. However, different airlines can always put a
more restraining guideline in their own carrier SOPs.
Human Limitations in the Modern Automated Flight Deck
While there is an obvious increase in complexity of
technology, the human role must change in order to keep
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up with the automation. In addition, for any mishaps,
human limitations appear to be blamed more and more
relative to the technology (Salas & Maurino, 2010). Air
traffic is increasing and new automation will be implemented to enhance SA in order to mitigate aviation
accidents. Even if all aircraft categories could benefit from
enhanced and synthetic vision systems, they are presently
not integrated in Part 121 and 135 regulations. The safety
benefits of those enhancing systems are apparent during
abnormal and emergency situations. Particularly in a high
workload environment, they permit the pilots, through their
intuitive displays and presentation methods, a possibility to
off-load some of the basic special awareness tasking such
as terrain and traffic avoidance (Prinzel & Kramer, n.d.). A
future key capability in managing the amplified amount of
air traffic is the concept of equivalent visual operations.
Here, operational tempos and procedures in reference to
Visual Flight Rules (VFR) are maintained, independent of
the actual outside weather conditions (Kramer, Bailey, &
Prinzel, 2009).
The FAA’s Next Generation Air Transportation System
(NextGen) is purportedly able to improve aviation operations, but also considerably change the jobs traditionally
held by pilots and air traffic controllers. Changes in roles
and allocation of function require new procedures, including ground and air responsibilities. Key to human
performance is ensuring that design mitigates the potential
for human error, recognizing that new automation and
procedures may also introduce new sorts of threats and
errors. Pilots and controllers will need to maintain SA
under new and different operational circumstances; otherwise, without effective management of those threats and
errors, they could easily find themselves in new undesired
states (Salas & Maurino, 2010). Pilot and controller
training, as well as strategic procedural guidance from
upper management, will be crucial aspects in implementing
NextGen. Additionally, an even more pronounced amount
of trust in automation is required to help create a tighter
traffic network. Autonomous pilot reactions to electronic
warnings can be anticipated to minimize delayed reactions
and also lessen workload of air traffic controllers.
Methodology
The proposed hypothesis is that, among accidents and
incidents involving CRM, there is a significant difference
between the proportion of management-related and nonmanagement-related accidents/incidents of U.S. commercial multi-crew airplanes during the final approach and
landing segment of flight. The null hypothesis is that there
were no differences in the proportion of airline management-related and non-management-related accidents/incidents (McDonald, 2009). A detailed analysis of publicly
accessible aviation accident/incident reports was performed
in order to accept or reject the null hypothesis.
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Data Review and Critique
After the review and critique of the collected data, a
slight research design change had to be performed. The
NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) online
database was excluded from the originally proposed pool of
data sources. From the 75 occurrences in the ASRS
database during the past 10 years, 35 events were CRMrelated. However, it was found that the ASRS reports
appeared to be biased by their authors—many providing
their own conclusions or suspected causes—so exclusion
was necessary in order to obtain an objective statistical
analysis. Even though the ASRS reports contain very
valuable information for accident prevention and aircrew
training enhancements, for the purpose of this study, only
final versions of the NTSB accident and incident reports
were considered. Therefore, all investigations on the
researched mishaps had been completed prior to this
project. As a result, due to the reduction in collected data,
the scope was expanded to include the landing phase of
flight. Many accidents and incidents, which were categorized under landing occurrences, showed significant parallels to the approach events and, as a matter of fact, most of
the causal factors actually originated during the approach
phase. Thus, including those events essentially provided
this research project with a beneficial amount of data to
permit an accurate statistical analysis. In addition, one more
incident report that was labeled under the go-around phase
also was included in the data collection. This minor
modification of the research design was necessary to permit
the inference needed to examine the hypothesis.
Data Collection
A data search was performed through the ‘‘Search
Aviation Accident Reports’’ link on the FAA (2012)
webpage, which opened a link to the NTSB (2012b)
‘‘Aviation Accident Reports.’’ The presented data was
reviewed, critiqued, and collected in reference to approach
and landing accidents/incidents of commercial multi-crew
airplanes in the U.S. NTSB (2012a) provided another
search possibility and allowed for a custom selection of
different criteria, which are displayed in Table 1.
An additional search was performed and focused on the
frequency of international airlines, which were involved in
CRM-related accidents and incidents within the U.S. The
only two altered categories were ‘‘Operation’’ (Part 129:
Foreign) and ‘‘Broad Phase of Flight’’ (All). Without a
structured and standardized classification system, a
quantification of trend-specific types of human errors
would almost be impossible as only a descriptive summary
of the reports would be achievable. Therefore, the Human
Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS),
as outlined in Appendix A, was used (Wiegmann &
Shappell, 2003).
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TABLE 1
Search criteria for the aviation accident database and synopses.
Accident/Incident Information
Event Start Date
Event End Date
Country
Investigation Type
Aircraft
Category
Amateur Built
Operation
NTSB Status
Report Status
Event Details
Broad Phase of Flight

January 1, 2002
August 31, 2012
United States
All (Incident, Accident)
Airplane
No
Part 121: Air Carrier
All
Approach, Go-Around, Landing

In total, 113 accidents and incidents were extracted for
analysis. After identifying all the mishaps in the researched
segments of flight, a categorization in regards to the
probable causes was performed. More precisely, a critical
assessment of the presented reports was conducted and
allocated to the different error categories of the unsafe acts.
Additionally, an investigation of the preconditions for
unsafe acts, mainly in the CRM category of personal
factors, was made (see Appendix A).
For the purpose of this research project, only the relevant
parts of the HFACS framework will be illuminated in more
detail. The unsafe acts category can be divided into two
groups: errors and violations (see Appendix A). Generally,
errors symbolize the unintentional mental and physical
actions of individuals that fail to achieve their intended
outcome. Violations, on the other hand, refer to the
deliberate disregard of rules and regulations (Wiegmann
& Shappell, 2003). However, the analysis of the collected
data was restricted to the identification of the various
errors. Those cases where the aircrews did not adhere to
SOPs, for instance, were included in the decision errors.
Skill-based errors
In the context of aviation, skill-based errors are best
explained as basic flying skill mistakes that occur without
substantial deliberate thought. Usually, actions resulting
from this type of error are especially vulnerable to failures
of attention and/or memory. In addition, these errors occur
in the execution of a routine, procedural task, training, or
proficiency and end in an unsafe situation. Examples
include: distraction, negative habit, task overload, misprioritizing, omitting checklist item or step in procedure,
poor airmanship, inadequate use of flight controls, and
breakdown of visual scan (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).
Decision error
This error form represents intentional behavior that
continues as planned. The only difference is that the plan
itself is inadequate or inappropriate for the given situation.
Those ‘‘honest mistakes’’ are usually committed because

the individuals did not have the correct knowledge or just
simply made a poor choice. Examples include: wrong
response to an emergency, exceeding ability, inadequate
knowledge of systems/procedures, and inappropriate
maneuver/procedure or problem solving (Wiegmann &
Shappell, 2003).
Perceptual error
Typically, perceptual errors happen when the aircrew
experiences either a degraded or unusual sensory input. In
general, when the perceptions of the surroundings differ
from reality, errors will occur. Examples include: misjudging distance/parameters, spatial disorientation, and visual
illusion (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).
Labeling
Accidents or incidents were labeled as ‘‘managementrelated’’ when the determined probable cause, a contributing factor, or the analysis section of the official NTSB
report mentioned any relevant findings about deficiencies
in company regulations, procedures, or aircrew training.
Statistical Analysis
After scrutinizing the collected data, a statistical analysis
of the outlined factors was conducted. A x2 test of
independence in the form of a 2 6 2 contingency table was
conducted to determine if there would be a statistically
significant ( p , 0.05) difference in the proportions of
airline management-related versus non-airline management-related causes of accidents/incidents. This test was
selected per the recommendation of the University of
California, Los Angeles (UCLA) Institute for Digital
Research and Education (IDRE, 2013) as the data was
non-parametric and categorical in nature. As noted by
McDonald (2009), ‘‘the chi-squared test of independence is
used when you have two nominal variables, each with two
or more possible values. A data set like this is often called
an ‘R6C table,’ where R is the number of rows and C is
the number of columns’’ (para. 3) and is appropriate when
‘‘comparing frequencies of one nominal variable for
different values of a second nominal variable’’ (para 1).
Results
The collected data, a sum of 113 investigation reports
that were extracted from the NTSB online database,
incorporated three different phases of flight. The approach
segment included a total of 41 (36 percent) accidents/
incidents; the landing phase listed 71 (63 percent) plus the
one (1 percent) event in the go-around segment. In regards
to CRM, 57 (50 percent) accidents/incidents listed a CRMrelated casual factor or included a similar commentary
within the analysis section of the report. Those 57
occurrences could further be divided into 35 (61 percent)
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Table 2
Data review and phase breakdown of CRM-related mishaps.

Accidents
Incidents

Approach

Landing

Go-Around

Totals

10 (29%)
2 (9%)

25 (71%)
19 (86%)

1 (5%)

35 (61%)
22 (39%)

Note. Numbers in table are frequencies and percentages (parentheses) of CRM-related mishaps. The dash (-) indicates that data in this specific area could
not be obtained.

accidents and 22 (39 percent) incidents. Table 2 illustrates
a detailed breakdown of the mishaps per segment of flight
for an enhanced review of the results.
After critical analysis of all the collected data, the three
different error types (skill-based, decision, and perceptual)
were allocated to the individual reports. In order to create a
valid contingency table with the minimum value of five in
each section, categories had to be combined. Perception and
skill-related errors were combined due to their identified
relationship in the literature. Table 3 indicates the reviewed
data and illustrates the chosen categories as well.
The results of the statistical analysis found that there was
no statistically significant difference in the proportions of
accident type, x2(1) 5 0.682, p 5 0.41, d 5 .156. Since p
. 0.05, it was necessary to reject Ha and to accept H0.
Limitations
In this case, not all of the NTSB accident and incident
reports were full investigation reports with hundreds of
pages. For some of the events there was only a short, but
completed, report available. At times, it was not more than
a factual summary with an official NTSB statement at the
end. Consequently, those reports did not contain the desired
detail on airline management procedures, training, and
guidelines. In addition, information about training attendance or more specific details could not always be
gathered. Yet the collected reports revealed enough data
in order to execute a valid statistical analysis.
The actual results of the statistical analysis indicated a
small effect size contrary to the planned medium effect
size. As such, the post hoc power calculation indicated that
the actual power did not meet the desired 0.80 level. Thus a
potential explanation of the conducted x2 is that the sample
size was not large enough to provide the necessary

sensitivity to detect differences in proportions of accident
types.
Discussion
Preconditions for Unsafe Acts
Whilst all of the categories in the preconditions for
unsafe acts (see Appendix A) are considered critical and
play a tremendous role in the investigation of an accident,
this research project focused more on the personal factors
in CRM, their operational application, and how this related
to EM on final approach. Examples include lack of
supervision, failure of leadership, misinterpretation of radio
calls, poor communication, lack of assertiveness, lack of
teamwork, and failure to conduct an adequate brief. The
condition of the operator category also covers some very
important states that can be of great impact in commencing
an unsafe act by the aircrew. Examples include the lack
of aptitude to fly, inadequate experience for complexity
of situation, information overload, distraction, channelized
attention, task saturation, overconfidence, stress, complacency, and loss of SA (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). All
of these examples of preconditions for unsafe acts are
paradigms for adverse mental states/limitations and require
detection first in order to mitigate the outcome and prevent
the occurrence of unsafe acts.
Good communication skills by flight crews are one of
the core topics of CRM. Cockpit voice recorders give
investigators insight into such communications after an
accident has occurred; however, they do not provide a full
understanding of all the activities on the flight deck, but
they can supply the investigators with an idea on what
happened prior to an accident and why (Nevile & Walker,
2005).

Table 3
Research results for a 2 6 2 contingency table.

Skill-Based Errors Only
Non-Skill-Based Errors or Combination of Errors
Total

Airline Management-Related Factors

Non-Airline Management-Related Factors

Total

7 (4/3/2)
6 (2/6/2)
13 (4/9/2)

18 (3/15/2)
26 (5/20/1)
44 (8/35/1)

25 (7/18/2)
32 (5/26/1)
57 (12/44/1)

Note. The category ‘‘Non-Skill-Based Errors or Combination of Errors’’ includes decision and perceptual errors and/or a combination of two or more of the
three error types. The values in parentheses reflect the different phases of flight (approach/landing/go-around). The dash (2) indicates that data in this
specific area could not be obtained.
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The research of Nevile and Walker (2005) not only
concentrated on the instant of error itself; instead, they
focused on the circumstance in which it occurred. Specific
elements of interaction led them to believe that the way
pilots communicate with each other can create a context for
error. In their findings, Nevile and Walker (2005), found
overlapping talk, lack of reply, and also unnecessary
corrections from the pilot in command. In the end, in
reference to their cited mishap, the flight crew did not work
together in harmony. Independently, each of those findings
may have been inconsequential, but collectively, they had a
snowballing effect. Consequently, standardized communication on the flight deck is a necessity in attaining
effective communication and ultimately effective crew
performance on final approach for the purpose of
decreasing accidents in this crucial phase of flight.
Attitudes and Human Behavior in Commercial MultiCrew Cockpits
In commercial airline cockpits today, with their modern
automation, pilots have to cautiously monitor the flight
path and systems (FAA, 2004). The percentage of threats
and errors increases especially during the approach-tolanding phase of flight (Helmreich et al., 2001). Therefore,
actively crosschecking the other flight crewmember and
his actions is needed or otherwise flight safety can be
compromised (FAA, 2004). Several accident reports (e.g.,
NTSB, 2004, 2010, 2011) indicate valuable lessons of
monitoring and challenging. Nevertheless, monitoring has
to precede challenging in order to observe the situation and
detect the deviation (Sumwalt, 1999).
The FO in the NTSB (2011) accident report undoubtedly
showed monitoring initiative and even challenged the
captain of the aircraft. Though, the large difference in
experience between the two pilots, in combination with her
weak assertiveness to enforce SOP adherence, most
probably discouraged her challenging efforts toward the
seasoned captain. On the other hand, the captain’s
deficiency in monitoring may have been influenced by
fatigue, but company training was mentioned as a
contributing factor as well.
The circumstances described in the NTSB (2004)
accident report were somewhat different. Here, considerable lack of monitoring by the captain and the flight
engineer were identified. Consequently, the unsafe acts that
led to the accident were not detected and safety was
compromised. Fatigue, high workload, and rushed procedures, no matter what, the errors were not detected or
challenged. Therefore, the ineffective crew monitoring and
crosschecking was literally the last line of defense that
failed and did not prevent the accident from happening
(FAA, 2004).
The NTSB (2010) revealed that the pilots were involved
in non-pertinent conversations during all segments of flight,

including those that are defined as critical by sterile cockpit
rule. Besides the actual causal factors of this accident, the
NTSB is concerned that neither pilot of the accident flight
seemed hesitant to engage in non-pertinent conversations or
demonstrated corrective behavior toward the other crewmember. Unfortunately, these facts leave room for interpretation that non-pertinent conversations among company
pilots during critical phases of flight were not unusual.
Conclusion
Admitting to errors is an important element of EM. It
assumes that events will not always turn out the way they
were anticipated because humans will make errors. The
perfect flight will most likely not be achievable, but striving
for perfection will help to keep errors small and manageable. Effectively managing these errors is key to safe flying
operations, thereby avoiding small errors from escalating to
dangerous levels (Spare, 2006b). Managing errors can be
accomplished best when crewmembers work together
effectively. Successful multi-crew cockpit operations are
a product of effective CRM training, which ought to be
well thought-out and strategically targeted to the requirements of the individual air carrier and the surroundings in
which they operate.
The FAA (2004) outlined CRM training and offers the
required standards for commercial airlines. Then again,
airlines usually design their own company SOPs for flight
deck crewmembers. The FAA (2003) has been providing
the elementary guidelines for those procedures. Still, many
of the researched data indicate that, particularly in reference
to effective communication and monitoring skills, the
aviation industry has a lack of standardization in CRM
training. Reoccurring similar causal factors in CRM-related
accidents and incidents could still be identified, although
CRM training evolved consistently (Salas, Wilson, Burke,
& Wightman, 2006).
The FAA (2003, 2004) included valuable examples for
setting the right priorities in reference to workload
management. Now, it is the responsibility of the individual
air carrier’s management to incorporate those guidelines
into their own CRM training programs and SOPs. By
offering aircrews the best possible tools to apply proper
CRM, only then is maximum crew performance attainable.
Almost two decades ago, Besco et al. (1994) identified the
necessity to improve flight crew training. However, the
greatest obstacle in their analysis was cost. In general,
airlines are very conscious about their budget and costs are
high, probably too high to spend much time talking about
low-probability events. As previously mentioned, the
potential cost increase for air carriers, with a contemporary
CRM training update for flight crews, would be negligible
if compared to the monetary loss of an aircraft, not even
considering the catastrophic outcome and subsequent
publicity.
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Helmreich et al. (2001) suggested, in order to decrease
the amount of errors commenced on approach, appropriate
TEM training is essential. Programs that aim for better
aircrew performance levels can do such by confronting
pilots with increased challenges to attain safe flying
operations (Gunther & Tesmer, 2001). Flight crews need
to continuously adjust the plan as they monitor, evaluate,
anticipate, and consider contingencies. Most importantly,
solid and dedicated preparation, planning, and execution
are prerequisites for successful and effective crew performance, especially in go-around decisions to avoid ALAs
(Spare, 2006a; NTSB, 2004, 2011). According to Sumwalt,
Thomas, and Dismukes (2002), policy changes, training,
and pilots following active monitoring concepts can
considerably improve crew monitoring and challenging
skills. One method to exercise those skills is through
including deliberate errors during LOFT scenarios. In the
end, enhancing flight crew monitoring skills can improve
flight safety (Sumwalt, 1999).
Further scientific research is vital in order to evaluate the
true impact of CRM training on flight safety. Key aspects
for improving monitoring and challenging skills in
effective EM are the air carrier’s policies and procedures,
especially during the high workload approach-to-landing
segment of flight.
As already suggested by Spare (2006b), flight crews
have to be mentally ready to initiate a go-around maneuver
when flight safety dictates. That mental state has to
supersede the different pressures to land the airplane
as scheduled. Thus, a wide-ranging implementation of
monitoring and challenging policies must be included in
the air carrier’s SOPs and training manuals. Air carrier
management has to enforce improved and strategically
targeted training to ensure their flight crews are adequately
prepared for the next generation of modern aviation
technology. Then again, it is crucial that flight crews
develop proper EM skills and procedures. Error detection
and recovery from errors should be reinforced in training
(FAA, 2004) in order to mitigate flight safety occurrences.
Effective CRM starts in initial training and is intensified by
repetition and feedback. Therefore, EM must encompass a
significant part of CRM training, while also being built in
to the corporate culture and continuously being emphasized
in every subsequent phase of training (FAA, 2004).
Clearly the importance of CRM and company guidance
to encourage such practices is essential to the mitigation of
pilot error accidents. The proper alignment of CRM and
SOPs can give flight crews the optimum tools and
environment to avoid falling prey to failures that could
potentially lead to an accident. Several possible lessons can
be gleaned from the findings of this study. Among CRMrelated accidents and incidents, there is no significant
difference in the percentages of occurrences based upon
airline management procedures or compliance thereof and
those that did not involve airline management issues. This
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indicates a favorable alignment of SOPs and CRM
philosophies. In theory, if there were large numbers of
CRM accidents in which management-related problems/
errors were noted, there could be a disconnect between
management and pilots in terms of procedures and
compliance. There are larger numbers, albeit not statistically significant, among non-management-related accidents/incidents, particularly in the non-skill-based category.
This may indicate that when there is compliance with CRM
and management protocol, a lower likelihood of negative
consequences exists. A key example would be the use of
proper monitoring and processes during the approach and
landing phase, which preserves error management in a critical
phase of flight. Further research into these possible
implications is necessary to confirm these suppositions.
This study sought to identify differences between the
management and non-management influences on CRMrelated accidents and incidents. Whilst more investigation
into this subject is required, this research was able to provide
preliminary evidence of the positive effects of active CRM
and airline management.
Suggestions for Future Research
Based on the findings of this study, the following
recommendations are made for future studies:
1. Repetition of the current study with a larger sample
size
2. A qualitative study of airline SOPs and CRM
procedures to evaluate themes and alignments of
goals, policies, training, and evaluation of these
aspects
3. An evaluation of the adoption and use of CRM
procedures internationally
4. An evaluation of recent approach and landing
accident reports to identify breakdowns in CRM
and/or SOP compliance or guidance
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Appendix A

Figure 1. The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS). Adapted from Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003.
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